Crossing the Waldnaab
D+0 | 20 July 1989, 10:00hrs - 15:00hrs vs @ Windischeschenbach
In Prague, the mood was somber. The Czechoslovakian leadership had its own internal problems and could not help but feel that, whatever way events unfolded, the coming war would only make their internal problems harder. Their enthusiasm for the coming offensive was, at best, lukewarm. Alas, political realities, including a Soviet army deep inside Czechoslovakia, meant that they had to be pragmatic for the sake of their own survival. They were fortunate that, in this display of realpolitik, they had the support of the Security forces and of the Army.
The Czechoslovakian Army had an ungrateful task in the war ahead. Unlike their East German allies, they would be attacking alone into a defense manned by the bulk of a West-German Panzer Grenadier Division, part of the US 1st Armored Division, and the 2nd Cavalry Squadron. They also had one of the smaller concentrations of 1st echelon forces available, and the Soviet Army behind them would take a significant amount of time to reach the front, being more of a mobile reserve for the Soviet forces than a 2nd echelon for the Czechoslovakian forces. They were under no illusions that, within the Warsaw Pact's strategy, their task would be one of the most difficult to achieve. Despite this, the Army was determined to be successful in the task assigned to them. This was, of course, dictated by the fact that being on the winning side would be far easier for the political leadership than being on the losing side. The Army, in this, agreed with the politicians, and an alliance of need was born between them. They both staked their future on a positive outcome for the war.
Czechoslovakian operations were planned to start later than the main attack originating from East Germany. The most important reason for this was to allow a concentration of air assets to develop air superiority over the attack corridors. As soon as the Czechoslovakian attack started, part of the Pact frontal aviation would switch to support them. In practice, because the Czechoslovakians feared that any delay in the aviation support would mean the bulk of their forces would be pummeled from the air at the border crossings, they only started to move en masse when the aviation was already doing its work. In practice, the result of these gaps was that the Czechoslovakian divisions ended up much more stretched and dispersed along their routes of advance. Their forward groups moved at the correct time. The remainder of the division forces was slower to start than scheduled.
The forward group of the 19th Mechanized Division was advancing south but in tandem with that of the 20th Mechanized Division. (Designer's Note: Refer to Campaign 1 for the operations of the 20th Mechanized Division.) The two groups moved rather swiftly over the border, making good use of the flat and vehicle-friendly terrain of the Weiden Gap. Making good use of the temporary air superiority over the area, their COs pushed their units to the limit, and, sooner than expected by NATO, the forward groups were clashing with the defending units as they were starting to consolidate their defenses.
Windinscheschenbach is a town at the center of a valuable road network, including the Autobahn 93 to the east. Not only that, but it is also crossed by a north-south rail line that, south of the town, offers a multitude of crossings of the Waldnaab River. These crossings were the immediate target of the forward group of the 19th Mechanized Division.
The Brigade Commander of the 10th PzG Bde, whose task was to defend this area, was well aware that the bridges could become a target. The most obvious solution to the problem was to blow them. Unfortunately, this would mean stranding all of the refugees heading west and, at this early time, political and military indecision meant that this was not fully authorized, and the 101st PzG Bn / 10th PzG Bde would have to retain and defend the Autobahn 93 crossings in the vicinity of Windinscheschenbach. As the 19th MRD approached, these crossings became the focal point of the operations.
Scenario by Jo Lima; Mike Johnstone; Charles Belva | Map by William van der Sterren